Post doctoral researcher. My research interests include the role of cash transfers in reducing poverty and inequality; effects of economic growth on child survival

I replicate the study by Oliver Jacques and Alain Noel on the Paradox of Redistribution in order to ascertain the role of universalism in the 21 st century. Through my findings and a comprehensive review of history, literature, and exogenous factors, I am able to support the conclusion of Jacques and Noel that the Paradox still exists in the modern welfare state and how it relates to universalism.

Some 20 years ago, Korpi and Palme (1998) published one of the most influential papers in the history of social policy discipline, in which they put forward a “paradox of redistribution”: the more countries target welfare resources exclusively at the poor, the less redistribution is actually achieved and the less income inequality and poverty are reduced. The current paper provides a state The existing literature on the determinants of income redistribution has identified a ‘paradox’. Namely, that countries with a high degree of market income inequality redistribute little, which is in disagreement with the median voter theorem. The paradox and its critics Korpi and Palme’s article on the paradox of redistribution remains one of the most widely cited articles in comparative welfare state research.

Paradox of redistribution

Namely, that countries with a high degree of market income inequality redistribute little, which is in disagreement with the median voter theorem. Rethinking the paradox of redistribution 2 should do about the less well-adjusted minority, and benefits are susceptible to retrenchment on the grounds of ‘fairness’ (Rothstein, 1998: 158). For no policy area are these logics likely to apply so strongly as for the policy area of The paradox and its critics Korpi and Palme’s article on the paradox of redistribution remains one of the most widely cited articles in comparative welfare state research. They present and support a politically important and rather counterintuitive argument: the more social benefits are targeted to the poor, much is actually available for redistribution. The reasoning is that, paradoxically, in countries with selective welfare systems less resources tend to be available for redistribution because there is less widespread and less robust political support for redistribution. As a consequence, the redistributive impact of such systems tends to be smaller.

The Paradox of redistribution by Walter Korpi and Joakim Palme (1998) posits that welfare states that have less targeted social spending redistribute more.

According to one theory, the development of redistribution and inequality reflects the initial structure of the social insurance institutions. In countries with social We present new versions of the Parrondo's paradox by which a losing game can be turned into winning by including a mechanism that allows redistribution of Conflict, the paradox of power, and income redistribution: a game-theoretic analysis In this paper, we present a conflict perspective on income inequality by Democracy, redistribution and inequality (No. w19746).

Debates on how to reduce poverty and inequality have focused on two con- troversial questions: Should social policies be targeted to low-income groups.

. Background Section 2.1 presents the system dynamics method, 2.2 presents the paradox of redistribution and section 2.3 presents system dynamics translations. Cumulatively, a large volume of spending and limited private provision is the mechanism that explains the “paradox of redistribution”: the less the countries resort to targeting through means testing, the more they reduce poverty and inequality. The paradox of redistribution * refers to the fact that welfare states in which a greater proportion of spending goes to universal programs tend to be more redistributive than welfare states in which a greater proportion of spending goes to targeted programs. social policy discipline, in which they put forward a “paradox of redistribution”: the more countries target welfare resources exclusively at the poor, the less redistribution is actually achieved and the less income inequality and poverty are reduced. The current paper provides a state-of-the-art review of empirical research into that paradox. with redistribution.

LIS working paper series No. 695. Korpi, W., Palme, J. (1998). The Paradox of Redistribution and Strategies of Equality : Welfare State Institutions, Inequality, and Poverty in the Western Countries. American Sociological Review, 63(5), 661-687. In 1998, Walter Korpi and Joakim Palme proposed a political and institutional explanation to account for the greater redistributive success of welfare states that 28 Jul 2017 The paradox of redistribution* refers to the fact that welfare states in which a greater proportion of spending goes to universal programs tend to 27 Jun 2013 It has all the makings of a great academic fist-fight.* In a classic 1998 article, Walter Korpi and Joakim Palme wrote a hugely influential article 13 Jun 2015 The Paradox of Redistribution Work by the OECD and others shows that the rising income share of the affluent, especially that of the top 1%, has IZA DP No. 7414: The Paradox of Redistribution Revisited: And That It May Rest in Peace? Ive Marx, Lina Salanauskaite, Gerlinde Verbist.
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The paper ends with a discussion and conclusion. . Background Section 2.1 presents the system dynamics method, 2.2 presents the paradox of redistribution and section 2.3 presents system dynamics translations. Cumulatively, a large volume of spending and limited private provision is the mechanism that explains the “paradox of redistribution”: the less the countries resort to targeting through means testing, the more they reduce poverty and inequality. The paradox of redistribution * refers to the fact that welfare states in which a greater proportion of spending goes to universal programs tend to be more redistributive than welfare states in which a greater proportion of spending goes to targeted programs.

Hence, the paradox: a country obtained more redistribution when it took from all to give to all than when it sought to take from the rich to help the poor. the paradox of redistribution. Journal of European Social Policy, 28(1), 70-85.
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THE PARADOX OF REDISTRIBUTION STRATEGIES OF EQUALITY 663 In an early critique of the emphasis on tar-geting in the U.S. policy debate, Korpi (1980a, 1983) contrasted a marginal social policy model with minimum benefits targeted at the poor with an institutional model based on universal programs intended to maintain

Donors differ in the amount of official development assistance dedicated to poverty reduction.

31 Aug 2015 In the literature on rich welfare states there is a well-known, even if somewhat controversial, paradox of redistribution. The idea is that,

The new ‘paradox of redistribution’?-A comparative study on migrant poverty in 15 European welfare states Author: Lutz Gschwind Supervisor: Joakim Palme The paradox of redistribution and strategies of equality : welfare state institutions, inequality and poverty in the Western countries / by Walter Korpi and Joakim Palme. Korpi, Walter, 1934- (författare) Palme, Joakim, 1958- (författare) Publicerad: Stockholm : Univ., Institutet för social forskning, 1997 Engelska 37 s.

The existing literature on the determinants of income redistribution has identified a ‘paradox’. Namely, that countries with a high degree of market income inequality redistribute little, which is in disagreement with the median voter theorem. In a first step, this paper outlines several mechanisms that explain why government corruption might be partially responsible for this ‘paradox In voting bodies, when voting weights are reallocated, it may be observed that the voting power of some members, as measured by the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf power indices, increases while their voting weight decreases.